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PRIVACY CHANNEL ~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ September 28, 1972

ACTION: THE WHITE HOUSE 0167

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM
BUNKER

REFS: A) WHS 2171; B) WHS 2173; C) WHS 2174

1. When I saw Thieu this morning, Refs B and C had not yet arrived. Consequently, I briefed him only on substance of Ref B.
2. I said that you had met with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy September 26 and 27 for a total of eleven hours; there had been no significant progress and no agreements of any kind were reached. We held firm on our basic program, including political questions.
3. The other side, however, had tabled still another proposal, the text of which I had not yet received. I said that I would transmit it to him when I had received it for his study and comments prior to General Haig's arrival. (I now have received Ref B and will hold off transmitting it to Thieu until tomorrow.)
4. I said that based on these most recent talks, we see practically no possibility of a settlement between now and November unless Hanoi completely reverses its position. It is essential, therefore, to insure that the situation is kept under control so that we will be in position to carry out our post-November strategy along the lines you discussed with him when you were last in Saigon.
5. I also informed Thieu of points contained in paragraphs 3 and 4

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of Ref A and said that General Haig will give him full briefing when he is here. I cautioned Thieu against any public characterization of private talks or other comments which might sabotage scenario which we have pursued together so successfully until now (paragraph 6, Ref A). In this connection, I took occasion to refer to statements contained in the GVN Memorandum of September 26 (Saigon 0165) indicating that the GVN might take a position at variance with our counter-proposals should it be necessary to make these public and said that any public evidence of disagreement can only play into the enemy's hands and those of our critics abroad. If and when it seems desirable to make public the proposals of the other side and our counter-proposals, we will want to consult together to assure that we have an agreed position.

6. Warm regards.

BUNKER

JK

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